Evidence From State Small-Group Health Insurance Reforms. Journal of Public Economics, 89(9-10): 1865-1877.Simon, Kosali. 2005. "Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets? Evidence from State Small Group Health Insurance Reforms." Journal of Public Economics 89, 1865-1877....
2005. Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets? Evidence from State Small-Group Health Insurance Reforms. Journal of Public Economics 89(9/10): 1865-... A Hodgson - 《Journal of Economic Education》 被引量: 5发表: 2014年 Limiting the ACA's Threats to Small Group Health Insurance Markets...
In this article, the author lays out a 30-minute classroom experiment designed for students to experience the kind of elevated prices and market collapse that can result from adverse selection in health insurance markets. The students should come away from the experiment understanding why adverse ...
limited access to healthcare services, and even the destabilization of insurance markets. To address adverse selection, insurance providers must implement strategies to balance the risk pool and ensure the sustainability of their plans
health insuranceadverse selectioncontract lengthWe study how increasing contract length affects adverse selection in health insurance markets. Although health risks are persistent, private health insurance codoi:10.2139/ssrn.2916823Darmouni, OlivierZeltzer, Dan...
Individual choice among health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: effi... DM Cutler,RJ Zeckhauser - De Gruyter 被引量: 484发表: 1998年 Adverse selection in health insurance markets? Evidence from state small-gro...
Adverse selection in health insurance markets may reduce social welfare by leading some low-risk consumers to underinsure or too few consumers to purchase coverage, relative to the socially optimal level. I study the social welfare implications of policies that are designed to mitigate these effects...
ADVERSESELECTIONININSURANCEMARKETS:POLICYHOLDEREVIDENCE FROMTHEU.K.ANNUITYMARKET AmyFinkelstein HarvardUniversityandNBER JamesPoterba MITandNBER RevisedAugust2002 ABSTRACT Inthispaper,weinvestigatetheimportanceofadverseselectionininsurancemarkets.Weusea uniquedataset,consistingofallannuitypoliciessoldbyalargeU.K.insuran...
Theoretical literature predicts that asymmetric information in insurance markets generate inefficient outcomes and literature have mostly focus on adverse selection and moral hazard caused by information advantage in insurance market. Adverse selection is the likelihood of those who anticipate more need of h...
Much of the extensive empirical literature on insurance markets has focused on whether adverse selection can be detected. Once detected, however, there has... AF Finkelstein - 《Social Science Electronic Publishing》 被引量: 43发表: 2007年 Adverse selection in the health insurance market: some emp...