Individual choice over health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiencCutler, David M.Zeckhauser, Richard J.Social Science Electronic PublishingCutler, David M., and Richard J. Zeckhauser. "Adverse selection in...
Adverse selection can undermine the very foundation of health insurance. Insurance plans operate on the principle of risk-sharing, where the premiums paid by low-risk individuals help cover the costs of those with higher risks. However, when adverse selection is present, this balance is disrupted,...
文档标签: Adverse Selection in Health Insurance 系统标签: adverse selection insurance health volume zeckhauser ThisPDFisaselectionfromanout-of-printvolumefromtheNational BureauofEconomicResearch VolumeTitle:FrontiersinHealthPolicyResearch,volume1 VolumeAuthor/Editor:AlanM.Garber,editor VolumePublisher:MIT Volum...
2008. Adverse selection in health insurance market: some empirical evidence. The European Journal of Health Economics. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg.Resende M, Zeidan R: Adverse selection in the health insurance market: some empirical evidence. Eur J Health Econ 2010, 11(4):413-418....
complex role in the healthcare ecosystem, and their actions can contribute to the escalation of healthcare costs in several ways. Two key aspects to consider are profit margins and the business of health insurance, as well as the influence of risk pooling and adverse selection on prem...
Individual choice among health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiency losses from individuals' being allocated to the wrong plans; risk-sharing losses, because premium variability is increased; and losses from ...
Individual choice over health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiency losses from individuals being allocated to the wrong plans; risk sharing losses since premium variability is increased; and losses from insurers...
2005. Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets? Evidence from State Small-Group Health Insurance Reforms. Journal of Public Economics 89(9/10): 1865-... A Hodgson - 《Journal of Economic Education》 被引量: 5发表: 2014年 Limiting the ACA's Threats to Small Group Health Insurance Markets...
Adverse selection is substantially reduced if premiums are varied according to demographic factors. Adverse selection is also restricted in supplementary insurance markets. In this market, supplementary policies are underpriced because a part of the additional benefits that purchasers can expect is a cost...
This paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets, where adverse selection is a potential concern. We leverage a major change to insurance provision that occurred at a large firm to identify substantial inertia, and develop and estimate a choice model that also quantifies risk pre...