Adverse selection in health insuranceD M CutlerR J ZeckhauserIndividual choice among health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiency losses from individuals' being allocated to the wrong plans; risk-sharing ...
The presence of adverse selection in health insurance can have wide-ranging consequences for both insurance providers and insured individuals. These consequences stem from the imbalanced risk profile within the insured pool, where higher-risk individuals are more likely to enroll in insurance plans. Her...
Individual choice among health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiency losses from individuals' being allocated to the wrong plans; risk-sharing losses, because premium variability is increased; and losses from ...
Editor:AlanM.Garber,editor VolumePublisher:MIT VolumeISBN:0-262-57120-X VolumeURL:http://.nber/books/garb98-1 PublicationDate:January1998 ChapterTitle:AdverseSelectioninHealthInsurance ChapterAuthor:DavidM.Cutler,RichardJ.Zeckhauser ChapterURL:http://.nber/chapters/c9822 Chapterpagesinbook:(p.1-32...
Evidence of Adverse Selection in Iranian Supplementary Health Insurance Market Existence or non-existence of adverse selection in insurance market is one of the important cases that have always been considered by insurers. Adverse sel... G Mahdavi,Z Izadi - 《Iranian Journal of Public Health》 被...
2005. Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets? Evidence from State Small-Group Health Insurance Reforms. Journal of Public Economics 89(9/10): 1865-... A Hodgson - 《Journal of Economic Education》 被引量: 5发表: 2014年 Limiting the ACA's Threats to Small Group Health Insurance Markets...
The consideration of complex sampling in the probit estimations led to empirical evidence that does not indicate the presence of adverse selection, but which highlighted some interesting features of the relationship between the selected variables. 展开 关键词: Adverse selection Health insurance market D...
health insuranceadverse selectioncontract lengthWe study how increasing contract length affects adverse selection in health insurance markets. Although health risks are persistent, private health insurance codoi:10.2139/ssrn.2916823Darmouni, OlivierZeltzer, Dan...
Adverse selection in health insurance markets may reduce social welfare by leading some low-risk consumers to underinsure or too few consumers to purchase coverage, relative to the socially optimal level. I study the social welfare implications of policies that are designed to mitigate these effects...
Besides strands of the general literature about adverse selection in health insurance that is theoretically based on the work by Rothschild and Stiglitz [5] and discussed by Cutler and Zeckhauser [6], this paper is first, closely related to the branch of literature dealing with risk selection in...