事实上可以证明，这种情况下有收益等价原理，就是说对于卖家而言，两种拍卖的期望收益是一样的。但是如果...
维克里拍卖(Vickrey auction),即次价密封投标拍卖(Second-price sealed-bid auction)。投标者在不知道其他人标价的情况下递出标单,标价最高的人得标,但只需付次高的标价。虽然维克里拍卖早在1893年就被用在邮票的拍卖上[1],这种拍卖方式在学术上最早是由哥伦比亚大学教授威廉·维克里于1961年提出的[2]。这类拍...
1) Vickrey strategy Vickrey策略2) Vickrey auction Vickrey拍卖 1. In order to provide incentive to cooperate for nodes in Ad hoc networks, the incentive to cooperate with each other and to motivate those nodes to reveal their cost of participating in network responsibilities, the destination-...
In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders' reports of private information, and then efficiently allocates this quantity among the bidders. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy with private values and an ex...
andthenefficientlyallocatesthisquantityamongthebidders.Truthfulbiddingisadominantstrategywithprivatevaluesandanexpostequilibriumwithinterdependentvalues.Iftheauctionisfollowedbyresale,thentruthfulbiddingremainsanequilibriumintheauction-plus-resalegame.Insettingswithperfectresale,theVickreyauctionwithreservepricingmaximizesseller...
andthenefficientlyallocatesthisquantityamongthebidders.Truthfulbiddingisadominantstrategywithprivatevaluesandanexpostequilibriumwithinterdependentvalues.Iftheauctionisfollowedbyresale,thentruthfulbiddingremainsanequilibriumintheauction-plus-resalegame.Insettingswithperfectresale,theVickreyauctionwithreservepricingmaximizesseller...
auction, in which bidders raise each other bids until only one bidder remains. Vickrey showed that in this type of auction, each bidder's dominant strategy is to keep bidding until the price reaches her maximum willingness to pay for the good, and then to drop out of the auction. The ...
It is well-known that there is no cost-sharing mechanism that is budget balanced, efficient, and dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC). The Vickrey auction is DSIC and efficient, but raises surplus revenue. In an environment where players have constant marginal values, we introduce a su...
Under this novel condition, agents need to deviate from the dominant truth-telling strategy. This paper presents a strategy for bidders in repeated Vickrey auctions who are intending to inflict losses to fellow agents in order to be more successful, not in absolute measures, but relatively to ...
Correction to: The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction doi:10.1007/s10683-022-09746-xADVICEAUCTIONSEXPERIMENTAL economicsINTERNET auctionsThe original article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09736-5...