升价拍卖（英式拍卖）是唯一的strategy-proof（竞拍者没有激励去假装自己的估值）且可信的机制。
维克里拍卖(Vickrey auction),即次价密封投标拍卖(Second-price sealed-bid auction)。投标者在不知道其他人标价的情况下递出标单,标价最高的人得标,但只需付次高的标价。虽然维克里拍卖早在1893年就被用在邮票的拍卖上[1],这种拍卖方式在学术上最早是由哥伦比亚大学教授威廉·维克里于1961年提出的[2]。这类拍...
另外，李绳武2017年在AER上发表的论文Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanism则指出：虽然升价拍卖（英式拍卖）...
We prove that, if everyone else bids locally in a single auction, the global bidder should always place non-zero bids in all available auctions, provided there are no budget constraints. With a budget, however, the optimal strategy is to bid locally if this budget is equal or less than ...
information of other bidders) and that truthful bidding is a dominant strategy in a model with private values (a bidder’s value depends only on its own private information). . Thus, reserve pricing does not interfere with many of the desirable features of a Vickrey auction. ...
on improved Vickrey auction model. The results show that the proposed algorithm and the strategy is feasible, which can improve the efficiency of job scheduling, and can reduce and avoid unnecessary losses in grid computing. Keywords: Grid, Job Scheduling, Vickrey Auction, Subset Tree, The ...
Willingness-to-paydataelicitedwiththehelpofincentivecompatiblemethodsliketheVickreyauctionandtheBDMmechanismpromisehighervaliditythanstatedpreferencesdataandprovidemoreinformationcontentthandorevealed-preferencesdata.However,researchshowsthatsubjectsinaVickreyauctiondonotalwaysfollowthedominantstrategyofbiddingtheirWTP,but...
And auction, as an efficient resource allocation method, has an important role in MAS problems and as such is receiving increasing attention from scholars. This paper suggests a protocol (VAMA) and strategies for multi-attribute auction. Some useful properties such as strategy-proof are also ...
An iterative generalized Vickrey auction: Strategy-proofness with- out complete revelation. In Proc. AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents. AAAI Press, March 2001.D. C. Parkes, "An iterative generalized vickrey auction: strategy-proof- ness without complete revelation...
auction, each bidder's dominant strategy is to keep bidding until the price reaches her maximum willingness to pay for the good, and then to drop out of the auction. The highest-value bidder then ends up winning the good, and paying a price equal to the second-highest bidder's value ...