VCGVickrey-Clarke-Groves(auction theory) VCGVertical Center of Gravity VCGVoiding Cystourethrography VCGValue Creation Group(various locations) VCGVenice Consulting Group(Venice, California) VCGVirtual Coordination Group(US DoD) VCGVideo Clock Generator ...
In this paper we propose a game theoretic approach to storage allocation for video surveillance camera systems based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction mechanism.doi:10.1016/j.ifacol.2022.08.008Alexandre MartinsDepartment of Automatic ControlHung-Yu Wei...
A VCG auction (named after their inventors Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves) is a generalization of the single-good, second price Vickrey auction to the case of a combinatorial auction (multiple goods, from which any participant can bid on each possible combination). We for- malize in this entr...
The Vickrey auction and Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanisms more generally achieve allocative efficiency and dominant strategies, but are often plagued by budget imbalance. In this paper, we have shown that the budget surplus need not rule out
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves MechanismGeneralized Vickrey Auctiondoi:10.1007/978-0-387-30162-4_463Ming-Yang KaoSpringer US
See Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973) for the first papers on the VCG mechanism. Although the new auction mechanism could be explained to advertisers prior to switching to VCG, since online advertising systems typically contain an enormous number of advertisers, it would be impo...
Vickrey auctioncoreThis paper considers a class of combinatorial auctions with ascending prices, which includes the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and core-selecting auctions. We analyze incentives in ascending combinatorial auctions under complete information. We show that in every ascending auction, the...
aclicktotheirwebsiteThesearchenginedetermineswhoseadvertisementswillgettothepageandinwhatposition,basedonthebidsofalltheadvertisersDifferenttypesofsuchauctionsarediscussedusingtheexampleoftheYandexsearchenginebasedontheVickrey–Clarke–GrovesmechanismThemainresultisaformalizationoftheconceptofanauctionwithtwo-stageranking...
We investigate the algorithmic performance of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in the single item case. We provide a formal definition of a Vickrey algorithm for this framework, and give a number of examples of Vickrey algorithms. We consider three performance criteria, one corresponding to a Pareto...
In such auctions, bidders pay at least their Vickrey–Clarke–Groves payments. A specific strategy profile studied by Bernheim and Whinston [Bernheim, B.D., Whinston, M., 1986. Menu auctions, resource allocation and economic influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 1–31] is a Nash ...