Multiple sendersIn a canonical multi-sender Bayesian persuasion game, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017a) show that increasing the number of senders cannot decrease the amount of information revealed. They assume: (i) information can be arbitrarily correlated, (ii) senders reveal information simultaneously,...
As an example, we apply this result to a signaling game with multiple senders and receivers with private information, where the payoffs are supermodular in messages sent and receivers' actions. While, as mentioned earlier, single-crossing conditions do not generalize as easily to games with at ...
Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces We characterize the information revealed in pure-strategy equilibria and show that greater competition tends to increase the amount of information revealed... M Gentzkow,E Kamenica - 《Games & Economic Behavior》 被引量: 33发表: 2017...
Besides, the second case is more robust-yet-fragile, which means that the network can survive after multiple times of external shocks before a certain one leading to systemic collapse. At last, he found that heterogeneity of each node has two sides of impacts on the stability of the system:...
Norman (2017) , `On Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders', mimeo.Fei Li and Peter Norman. On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders. Working Paper, 2015.Li, F. and P. Norman (2017a): "On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders," mimeo....
A passive attack does not modify or interfere with communication but rather listens to or monitors the information that was transmitted. Information that can be found on the Internet can be collected for sale on the darknet; these attacks can require the use of multiple specialised tools over a...
A passive attack does not modify or interfere with communication but rather listens to or monitors the information that was transmitted. Information that can be found on the Internet can be collected for sale on the darknet; these attacks can require the use of multiple specialised tools over a...
On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders. University of North Carolina. unpublished results.LI, F. and NORMAN, P. (2015), "On Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders" (Mimeo, University of North Carolina).Li, F. and P. Norman (2017) , `On Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders', ...