Bayesian persuasionMonetary transfersSignal informativenessWe analyze a persuasion game in which a sender wants to persuade a receiver to take an action. The sender first produces information about the benefits of taking the action and then offers monetary transfers to the receiver. We characterize a ...
(2024 arXiv) Causal Inference with Large Language Model: A Survey. Jing Ma. [pdf] (2024 arXiv) Large Language Models and Causal Inference in Collaboration: A Comprehensive Survey. Xiaoyu Liu, Paiheng Xu, Junda Wu, Jiaxin Yuan, Yifan Yang, Yuhang Zhou, Fuxiao Liu, Tianrui Guan, Haoliang...
Top ML Papers of the Week (February 12 - February 18) - 2024 PaperLinks 1) Sora - a text-to-video AI model that can create videos of up to a minute of realistic and imaginative scenes given text instructions; it can generate complex scenes with multiple characters, different motion types...
Optimal persuasion, a la Kamenica-Gentzkow (2011), require Senders to commit to reporting strategies; one potential source of such commitment is repeated interaction. We study a model in which a long lived Sender plays a cheap talk game with a se- quence of short lived Receivers who observe ...
Bayesian persuasionqueueing gameConsider a single-server service system with uncertain quality level (which is assumed to be binary). Both the server and the customers know the distribution ofGuo, PengfeiHaviv, MosheLuo, ZhenweiWang, YulanSocial Science Electronic Publishing...
14日,刘云川教授作题为“Persuasive Conflicts of Interest: Influencing Social Media Influencer with Influencer Brand”的学术讲座,以其研究文章“Sleeping with Enemy: The Benefits of Conflicts in Marketing Campaign Sponsorship with B...
This paper introduces private sender information in a game of Bayesian persuasion with monotonic sender preferences. I derive properties of increasing differences related to the precision of signals and use these to characterize the set of equilibria selected by the D1 criterion. These equilibria are ...
Bayesian PersuasionRegime ChangeMixed MessagesRevolutionWe study a regime change model where many citizens, who are imperfectly informed about the regime's strength, decide whether to participate in a revolt. The regdoi:10.2139/ssrn.3306689Song, Yangbo...
Gentzkow, Matthew, and Emir Kamenica, 2016, A rothschild-stiglitz approach to bayesian persua- sion., The American Economic Review 106, 597-601.GENTZKOW, M., AND E. KAMENICA (2016): "A Rothschild-Stiglitz Approach to Bayesian Persuasion," Ameri- can Economic Review, Papers & Proceedings, ...
A Bayesian Perspective on Persuasion, Evaluation, and ProjectionLauderdale, Benjamin E