We give a characterization for the Nash equilibrium payoffs using mixed strategies as reachable and consistent, these concepts being adapted to random controls. Finally, still referring to repeated games, we study the set of publicly correlated equilibrium payoffs for differential games and show that...
We modify the epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium only to accommodate Gilboa and Schmeidler's [I. Gilboa, D. Schmeidler, Maxmin expected utility with nonunique prior, J. Math. Econ. 18 (1989) 141鈥 153] maxmin expected utility preferences, and identify the equilibrium concept in n -...
Barelli, P and Duggan, J 2013,`Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and inter- dependent payoffs'. Mimeo, University of Rochester.P. Barelli and J. Duggan, Purification of Bayes Nash Equilibrium with Correlated Types and Interdependent Payoffs, working paper, University ...