nonequivalence of teleological & causal explanations in psychologyThe relation of teleological to causal explanations in psychology is examined. Nagel's claim that they are logically equivalent is rejected. Two
This suggests that arrows are used to represent causal rela- tionships regardless of the strength of the claim. To illustrate, let us compare the figures and text of two articles. First, in Fig. 2, Gates (2009) uses two path-style models to develop a historically contingent theory of ...
74) claim that “we never can observe any tye between” a cause and an effect. The cause or power that produces motion can be “directly experienced” (Michotte, 1946/1963, p. 21) in a single instance. Therefore there is no need for repeated experience of the conjunction of the cause ...
High conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent is plau- sibly one of the conditions of acceptability of conditionals (Over et al. 2007; Douven and Verbrugge 2012), but it is not required for classifying a tendency causal claim as true, as we have seen in the (3a/b) ...
A longitudinal, but observational, study suggests that early television exposure is positively associated with attentional problems in later childhood (Christakis et al., 2004). The authors' conclusion is that limiting children's screen time helps to prevent attentional problems. This causal claim is ...
. . experiments give a false sense of rigor and causal identification (recall the quote from that Harvard professor, later notorious for his claim of 100% replication rate). p.33, “indeterminate situation.” Part of a wonderful story about a stuck lock. Professional skeptic Michael Shermer ...
Rather it takes a great tangle of scientific work to support a general claim, including a great deal of conceptual development, theory and the confirmation of a variety of different kinds of effects that the general claim implies. Nancy Cartwright (2016), "Where's the Rigor When You Need It...
No big deal, we all make mistakes, but I hope the Times can run a correction of equal length to the original article, explaining that the claim about names has been shot down, and also educating readers a bit on the uncertainties of this sort of scientific finding. I do not think they...
Mechanists would not make such a claim. Instead, they speak of causal mechanisms operating and interacting at different ‘levels’ (e.g., the act of walking reflects the movement of leg muscles and is explained by the actions of neurons triggering muscle fiber contractions, etc.). Some ...
The upshot is that mental properties are, at a minimum, fully grounded in physical properties. The non-reductive physicalist thus gets exactly what she wants. The conclusion does not commit us to the identity of the mental and the physical, but it still secures that dualism, the claim that...