那么,如果给定了先验概率μ′,V(μ′)就是在满足Eτμ=μ′的约束下,sender可以实现的最大效用为Eτv^(μ)=z。那么根据贝叶斯相容法则,我们应该给定μ0,即V(μ0)就是sender 可以通过Bayesian Persuasion实现的最大效用。 下面是一个图形表示:黑色线表示v^(μ),绿色区域表示其convex hull,而红色线则表示conc...
首先还是通过一个简单例子来理解 Bayesian Persuasion 的直觉,虽然后面的proof部分很多没看懂,但这个例子应该是已经完全搞清楚了。这个例子里面有三个个体:法官、嫌疑犯、检察官。 嫌疑犯有 P(guilty)=0.3 的概率有罪,有 P(innocent)=0.7 的概率无罪,这是一个先验概率,对于法官和检察官来说也是共同知识。 法官(ju...
经典论文导读:贝叶斯劝说(BayesianPersuasion)——Kamenica...本期向大家介绍据说(据说是 Holmstrom在课上说的)是近十年最重要的一篇经济学理论研究论文——(Kamenica&Gentzkow,2011),两位作者均为哈佛大学经济学博士(两人从本科就一直就读于哈佛),论文发表时均为芝加哥大学经济学教授,Kamenica现仍在Chicago,Gentzkow已跳...
Bayesian Persuasion Emir Kamenica University of Chicago Matthew Gentzkow University of Chicago (Now Stanford) Abstract When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, ...
内容提示: Bayesian PersuasionEmir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow (2010)presented by Johann Caro Burnett and Sabyasachi DasMarch 4, 2011Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow (2010) (presented by Johann Caro Burnett and Sabyasachi Das)Bayesian PersuasionMarch 4, 20111 / 23 文档格式:PDF | 页数:47 | ...
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We study a model of Bayesian persuasion between a designer and a receiver with one substantial deviation from the standard setup鈥攖he designer offers once and for all a single statistical experiment from which the receiver can acquire costly i.i.d. signals over time. Taking a 2-state-2-...
ec11ch10_kamenica arjats.cls bayesian persuasion and information design When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion ...
Originating from Kamenica and Gentzkow (Am Econ Rev 101(6):2590–2615, 2011), we analyze multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion games with heterogeneous beliefs without strategic interactions among receivers, which we call unlinked. We show that given the receivers’ best-responses, the sender’s ration...