Individual choice over health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiencCutler, David M.Zeckhauser, Richard J.Social Science Electronic PublishingCutler, David M., and Richard J. Zeckhauser. "Adverse selection in...
Adverse selection can undermine the very foundation of health insurance. Insurance plans operate on the principle of risk-sharing, where the premiums paid by low-risk individuals help cover the costs of those with higher risks. However, when adverse selection is present, this balance is disrupted,...
Adverse selection in the health insurance market: Some empirical evidence. European Journal of Health Economics, 11: 413-418, 2010.Resende M. , and Zeidan R. , Adverse selection in the health insurance market:some empirical evidence [ J ]. The European Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 11,...
文档标签: Adverse Selection in Health Insurance 系统标签: adverse selection insurance health volume zeckhauser ThisPDFisaselectionfromanout-of-printvolumefromtheNational BureauofEconomicResearch VolumeTitle:FrontiersinHealthPolicyResearch,volume1 VolumeAuthor/Editor:AlanM.Garber,editor VolumePublisher:MIT Volum...
Individual choice among health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiency losses from individuals' being allocated to the wrong plans; risk-sharing losses, because premium variability is increased; and losses from ...
Individual choice over health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiency losses from individuals being allocated to the wrong plans; risk sharing losses since premium variability is increased; and losses from insurers...
2005. Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets? Evidence from State Small-Group Health Insurance Reforms. Journal of Public Economics 89(9/10): 1865-... A Hodgson - 《Journal of Economic Education》 被引量: 0发表: 2014年 Selection-Proof Health Insurance Exchanges BACKGROUND: Despite efforts...
Another example is the health insurance market in which the buyers may know more about their health problems than the insurers, providing more incentive for less healthy individuals to seek insurance, thus raising the overall price at which providers are willing to make insurance available to all ...
Information asymmetry, adverse selection and joint-ventures ☆ : Theory and evidence Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-Off between Competition and Adverse Selection ...
A simulation was used to explore the effects of variations in the rate at which applicants drop out of selection processes on racial differences in selecti... ANITA,P.,TAM,... - 《Personnel Psychology》 被引量: 25发表: 2004年 Europe and Central Asia - Health insurance and competition Healt...