Since Paul Samuelson introduced the theory of revealed preference, it has become one of the most important concepts in economics. This chapter surveys some recent contributions in the revealed preference literature. We depart from Afriat's theorem, which provides the conditions for a data set to ...
内容提示: The Theory of Weak Revealed Preference ∗Victor H. Aguiar † Per Hjertstrand ‡ Roberto Serrano §This version: May 2019Abstract We of f er a rationalization of the weak generalized axiom of revealedpreference (WGARP) for both f inite and inf inite data sets of consumer ...
This paper deals with the relationship of the economic theory of price index numbers to the theory of revealed preference. This theory, pioneered by Samuelson and developed by Houthakker represents a model of consumer behavior. Samuelson's basic assumptions had been influenced considerably by the ...
revealed preference theory 作者:Christopher P. Chambers/Federico Echenique 出版社:Cambridge University Press 出版年:2016-1-5 页数:235 定价:USD 34.99 装帧:Paperback 丛书:Econometric Society Monographs ISBN:9781107458116 豆瓣评分 评价人数不足 写笔记...
网络显示偏好理论;显示性偏好理论;性偏好定见 网络释义
the revealed preference relation of Arrow, the wide revealed preference relation of Richter. It is also shown that a weaker version of our path independence condition is both necessary and sufficient for a rational choice. 展开 关键词: Revealed Preference Theory, Ordering and the Axiom of ...
Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference 热度: COMBINING REVEALED AND STATED PREFERENCE DATA TO ESTIMATE THE… 热度: Ch07Revealed Preference-v 热度: TheDemandTheoryoftheWeakAxiomofRevealedPreference RichardKihlstrom;AndreuMas-Colell;HugoSonnenschein ...
Georgescu I (2004a) On the axioms of revealed preference in fuzzy consumer theory. J Syst Sc Syst Eng 13:279-296Irina Georgescu.On the axioms of revealed preference in fuzzy consumer theory[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering .2004(3)I. Georgescu, On the axioms of ...
We investigate equilibrium notions in game theory from the revealed preference approach. For extensive game forms with complete information, we derive a set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for the observed outcomes to be rationalized by subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Journal of Econo...
2. Preference Theory