This approach, called the variability approach, allows us to: show why both the need for communication and the coordination costs increase when the division of labor increases; explain why, while the firm relies on direction, the market does not; rigorously formulate the optimum divisionalization ...
今井・伊丹・小池 (1982),Imai and Itami (1984)Interpenetration of organization and market: Japan’s firm and market in comparison with the u.s →市場原理:M1 価格を情報媒体,個人的利益・効用最大化による自由な交換 M2 自由な参入・退出 →組織原理 O1 権限による命令,共通利害の最大化 O2...
F. (1982). “Marketing, Strategic Planning and the Theory of the Firm,” Journal of Marketing 44: 15–26. Article Google Scholar Alchian, A. A., and Demsetz, H. (1972). “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,” American Economic Review 62 (5): 777–795. Google ...
In this paper we draw on recent progress in the theory of (1) property rights, (2) agency, and (3) finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm.1 In addition to tying together elements of the theory of each of these three areas, our an
B. Branch Corporate objectives and market performance Financial Management (1973), pp. 24-29 Summer CrossrefGoogle Scholar Coase, 1937 R.H. Coase The nature of the firm Economica, IV, Irwin, Homewood, IL (1937), pp. 386-405 Reprinted in: Readings in price theory Google Scholar R.H. Coa...
1 产业组织理论-the theory of the firm
and after employee exit affect firms’ alumni relations climate—a shared perception among a firm’s current and former employees that the firm values alumni. We further theorize that the alumni relations climate will lead to creation of firm-level alumni resources, with the configuratio...
产业组织理论The_Theory_of_Industrial Organization.pdf,Jean Tirole The Theory of Industrial Organization The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England Contents Preface xi The Theory of the Firm 15 Introduction 1 1 What Is a Firm? 17 2 The Profit-
The operation of a firm clearly needs to consider the impact of its behaviour on different groups of stakeholders. On the one hand, equity investment can be attracted and retained by a firm that is accountable to its shareholders; on the other hand, the interests of other groups of ...
作者: Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 摘要: I develop a property rights theory of the firm to analyze the interdependence between the ownership structure of firms and the bargaining inefficiency that arises when managers have private information about the size of quasi-rents. I first ...