Mind, n.s. vol. 61 (1952), pp. 153–164. Reprinted with minor changes in: Problems of analysis, Philosophical essays, by Max Black, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1954, pp. 80–92, 292–293.Bergmann Gustav. The identity of indiscernibles and the formalist definition of "identity." ...
1975: `The Identity of Indiscernibles'. Journal of Philosophy, 72, pp. 249-56.Max Black. The Identity of Indiscernibles. Mind, 61:153-164, 1952.Black, M. (1952). "The Identity of Indiscernibles". Mind 61: 153-64.Black, M. 1952: `The Identity of Indiscernibles'. Mind, 61, pp....
Chapter V The Identity of Indiscernibles 5.1. Three grades of indiscernibilityI shall take the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) to be a neces-sary truth ranging over individuals (or substances). Now to say of two indi-viduals, x and y, that they are indiscernible is to...
Lecture 5: Explores consequences of Leibniz's idea that complete concepts allow deducing everything true about things. Covers Section 9, including the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. Discusses how complete concepts seemingly negate freedom but addresses Leibniz's defense of freedom and contingen...
Leibniz's famous Principle of the identity of indiscernibles (Pii) states that no two things are exactly alike. The Pii is commonly thought to be metaphysically necessary for Leibniz: the coexistence of two indiscernibles is metaphysically impossible. This paper argues, against the standard interpr...
(1999) Leibniz’s argument for the identity of indiscernibles in the correspondence with Clarke. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77(4): 429–438Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. "Leibniz's Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in His Correspondence with Clarke". En: Australasian Journal of Philosophy...
Discusses the grounds for Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Question of whether God could have brought about states X and Y conjointly; Question of whether God could have brought about state X or alternatively state Y but not a single world that contains ...
1 If one accepts bundle theory, the PCI and the thesis that all properties that function as ontological constituents are universals, then a version of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) follows: necessarily,for any thick particulars xand y: if it is the case that for ...
Time and the Deep Structure of Dynamics1393.The Identity of Indiscernibles. As most of you are philosophers, I amsure that you will be familiar with Leibniz’s ‘two great principles’. One isthe Identity of Indiscernibles. It says that if you imagine two things and saythat they are diffe...
On the other hand, a theory that eliminates the equivalent of Aristotelian "matter," like that of Leibniz, must require that individuals as such imply a unique, perhaps infinite, number of properties. Leibniz's principle of the "identity of indiscernibles" thus postulates that individuals which ...