tacit collusion 读音:美英 tacit collusion基本解释 默契合谋;默契共谋;暗中勾结;默示共谋;默契 分词解释 tacit缄默的 collusion共谋,勾结,串通 tacit collusion是什么意思 tacit collusion怎么读 tacit collusion在线翻译 tacit collusion中文意思 tacit collusion的解释 tacit collusion的发音 tacit collusion意思是什么 ...
act in collusion 【法】 相互勾结 bidding collusion 围标指投标人彼此串通勾结抬高标购价格或压低标售价格,而从中获取不当利益的不法行为。例如建设工程招标时,各竞标人事先约商,由每家提出权利金比价,决定由出价最高者得标,并由其它投标人分享该得标人所提出 tacit agreement 默契的协议 tacit admission 【...
Tacit Collusion is one of the biggest challenges to the free market. Such collusion reduces the competition and is not in the interest of the consumers. One thing that makes this collusion even more dangerous is that it is difficult to identify as well as prove. Since there is no formal ag...
This paper analyzes coordination in tacit collusion when firms芒鈧 劉 discount factor is private information. We consider an infinitely repeated duopoly where two states of the world randomly occur, with different incentives for collusion. Depending on its own discount factor, a firm chooses ...
tacit collusion 英文tacit collusion 中文【经】 暗地串通
分享到: 【经】 暗地串通 分类: 通用词汇|查看相关文献(pubmed)|免费全文文献 详细解释: 以下为句子列表: 英文: But tacit collusion may still be beyond them. 中文: 但默契结盟还不止这些。更详细... 分享到:
Citation: Hutchinson, C.S.;Ruchkina, G.F.; Pavlikov, S.G. TacitCollusion on Steroids: The PotentialRisks for Competition Resulting fromthe Use of Algorithm Technology byCompanies. Sustainability 2021, 13,951. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13020951Received: 18 December 2020Accepted: 14 January ...
tacitcollusion 本章要点: 价格默契合谋的传统解释 动态价格竞争的静态分析 动态价格竞争的重复博弈分析 价格刚性与“聚点价格”合谋(扭结需求曲线) 信息揭示、友好声誉与合谋 小结 2 ThetheoryofindustrialorganizationThetheoryofindustrialorganization SchoolofManagement&EconomicsSchoolofManagement&Economics 伯川德悖论暗示(一...
Chapter 10: Dynamic Models of OligopolyCollusion: firm conduct intended to coordinate the actions of firms2 problems to solve:(1) Firms reach an agreement regarding P and Q(2) Given the incentive to cheat, firms must enforce the agreement, requiring colluding firms to detect & punish firms ...
Contrary to the implications of some earlier research, we find that tacit collusion does not become pervasive with extensive repetition. In a ‘strong no-power’ design persistently competitive outcomes are observed in markets with three or four sellers. Even duopolies are frequently competitive in ...