Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium: An Example 1 1 1 2 2 A B C D E F L L R R 3 2 6 4 2 1 4 6 8 5 3 0 The extensive form game above has 3 subgames: One is the whole game, since any game is a subgame of itself. There are two more subgames, on...
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium: An Example 1 1 1 2 2 A B C D E F L L R R 3 2 6 4 2 1 4 6 8 5 3 0 The extensive form game above has 3 subgames: One is the whole game, since any game is a subgame of itself. There are two more subgames, one beginning after A and...
SPE只有一个：（默许，进入）我们来观察一下（竞争，不进入）这个NE而非SPE，其潜在的假设是，无论B...
In this case,one of the Nash equilibriums is not subgame-perfect equilibrium.
1)subgame perfect Nash equilibrium子博弈精炼纳什均衡 1.The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium which leads to profit maximization is given when there are different types of consumers.建立在同类产品存在多方面差异条件下双寡头企业两阶段动态定位定价博弈模型,在市场中存在不同类型消费者时,求出了使企业利润最大...
GOV 2005: Game Theory Section 5: Subgame-Perfect Eqm Alexis Diamond adiamond@ Agenda Main ideas Key terms Extensive Games, Backward Induction Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium Baron and Ferejohn: Bargaining in Legislatures The strategic setting Two-round, 3 candidate closed rule game Two-round, n-...
6.1SubgamePerfectNashEquilibrium ConsiderthedynamicInvestmentinNewProductgameofcompleteinformation,inwhichfirm1choosesfirstandfirm2choosesafterhe/sheobservesthefirm’schoice.Themarketdemandis high.1 x1 a b 2 2 x2 x3 a x4 300,300 b x5 800,0 a x6 0,800 b x7 0,0 TherearetwoNashequilibriainabove...
Backward Induction • Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium • Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium • Baron and Ferejohn: Bargaining in Legislatures • Baron and Ferejohn: Bargaining in Legislatures – The strategic setting – The strategic setting – Two-round, 3 candidate closed rule game – Two-...
178 CHAPTER 11. SUBGAME-PERFECTNASHEQUILIBRIUM 1 B R (2,6) L R (0,1) (3,2) (-1,3) (1,5) Figure 11.6:A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium Sometimes subgame-perfect equilibrium can be highly sensitive to the way we model the situation. For example, consider the game in Figure 11.6....
Subgame perfect Nash equilibriumLearning methodCost to moveProximal point methodIn one-leader one-follower two-stage games, also called Stackelberg games, multiplicity of subgame perfect Nash equilibria (henceforth SPNEs) arises when the best reply correspondence of the follower is not a single-valued...