While it’s never been officially disclosed exactly who created Stuxnet, thewormis widely understood to have been developed together by the US and Israel governments. Increasingly concerned by the progression of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the two governments examined a range of options, which...
While it’s never been officially disclosed exactly who created Stuxnet, thewormis widely understood to have been developed together by the US and Israel governments. Increasingly concerned by the progression of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the two governments examined a range of options, which...
Regardless of who did it, Stuxnet representsthe opening of a particularly well-stocked Pandora’s box: highly-specific sabotage targetting of embedded (and potentially critical) industrial systems.As Bruce Sterling points out, anyone who hadn’t thought of it before has certainly thought of it now...
Stuxnet was not intended to spread beyond Iran’s nuclear facilities. However, the malware did end up on internet-connected computers and began to spread because of its extremely sophisticated and aggressive nature. However, it did little damage to outside computers it infected – because Stuxnet ...
[112] And, in late 2010 Borg stated, "Israel certainly has the ability to create Stuxnet and there is little downside to such an attack because it would be virtually impossible to prove who did it. So a tool like Stuxnet is Israel's obvious weapon of choice."[136] Iran uses P-1 ...
Call it an early skirmish in a culture clash between two worlds: the independent security researchers accustomed to dealing with tech firms such as Microsoft and Adobe, who have learned to embrace the hacker ethos, and the more conservative companies that develop and test industrial control sys...
This paper considers the impact of Stuxnet on cyber-attacks and cyber-defense. It first reviews trends in cyber-weapons and how Stuxnet fits into these trends. Because Stuxnet targeted an industrial control system in order to wreak physical damage, the f
plant even as it told controllers that everything was normal. But in 2010, Stuxnet escaped Natanz, probably on someone's laptop; once connected to the outside Internet, it did what it was designed not to do: spread in public. The blame game began about who had slipped up in the ...
Security designed in a vacuum has a problem—it is secure enough to stop only the people who did the design! Avoid security through obscurity. Secure techniques and algorithms should not rely on the fact that documentation on an algorithm or scheme is not publicly available. The best...
Kroft: Who was behind it? O Murchu: What we do know is that this was a very large operation. You're really looking at a government agency from some country who is politically motivated and who has the insider information from a uranium enrichment facility that would facilitate building a th...