As to the relative efficiency of the two equilibria, we show that the Cournot equilibrium can be more efficient than the Stackelberg equilibrium. This holds true in the short-run, at the steady-state, and in terms of discounted welfare....
We compare an n-firm Cournot model with a Stackelberg model, where n-firms choose outputs sequentially, in a stochastic demand environment with private inf... E Cumbul 被引量: 0发表: 2021年 Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly equilibrium We compare an n-firm Cournot model with a Stackelberg ...
Stackelberg versus Cournot Equilibrium .pdf We reconsider Stackelberg’s classical critique of the Cournot duopoly, in the framework of endogenous timing for two-player games. For quantity duopoly we provide different sets of minimal conditions, directly on the demand and cost functions, yielding ...
Stackelberg versus cournot: A differential game approach Journal of Economic Dynamicc and Control (2019) P.De Giovanniet al. Vendor management inventory with consigment contracts and the benefits of cooperative advertising European Journal of Operational Research ...
Stackelberg versus Cournot Equilibrium We reconsider Stackelberg's classical critique of the Cournot duopoly, in the framework of endogenous timing for two-player games. For quantity duopoly we ... Rabah,Amir,and,... - 《Games & Economic Behavior》 被引量: 274发表: 1999年 note on the cournot...
Protectionism versus non-protectionism under cost uncertainty in Cournot and Stackelberg marketsBenan Zeki Orbay … show all 1 hide Citations Purchase on Springer.com $29.95 / €24.95 / £19.95* Buy this eBook * Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT. Get Access Abstract...
When Stackelberg and Cournot Equilibria Coincide : The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics We take a new look at the comparison between the Stackelberg equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium. We show that, when the elasticity of the inverse market demand equals the curvature of the inverse mark...
Furthermore, this ratio also determines the qualitative type of equilibrium: Monopoly is reinstalled from both S and C if and only if the ratio lies outside the interval (1/2, 2); for values between 3/2 and 2, the Stackelberg leader deters entry of an inefficient follower while producing...
Heugues, M. (2011, March). Endogenous timing in pollution control: Stackelberg versus Cournot-Nash equilibria. Working Papers 2011-03, Basque Centre for Climate Change (BC3).Heugues, M. (2011). Endogenous timing in pollution control: Stackelberg versus Cournot-Nash equilibria. Working Papers ...
We compare an m-firm Cournot model with a hierarchical Stackelberg model where m Firms choose outputs sequentially. The Stackelberg equilibrium price is lower, so output and total surplus are higher; total profits are lower. While the first mover in a Stackelberg duopoly earns more than a Cournot...