Solving multi-leader-common-follower games. Optim. Methods Softw. 25 (4), 601-623.S. Leyffer, T. Munson, Solving multi-leader-common-follower games, Optim. Methods Softw. 25 (2010), 601-623.S. Leyffer and T. Munson. Solving multi-leader-common-follower games. Optimization Methods and ...
EXISTENCE, UNIQUENESS, AND COMPUTATION OF ROBUST NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A CLASS OF MULTI-LEADER-FOLLOWER GAMES (The bridge between theory and application in op... optimization technique, we first formulate the game as the robust Nash equilibrium problem and then as the generalized variational inequality...
Accumulation points of Nash equilibria exist for a decreasing sequence of these smoothing parameters and we show that these candidates fulfil the conditions of S-stationarity and are Nash equilibria to the multi-leader-follower game. Finally, we propose an update on the leader variables for ...
In this paper, we have reformulated a multilevel multi-leader multiple follower (MLMLMF) programming problem into an equivalent multilevel single-leader multiple follower (MLSLMF) programming problem by introducing a suppositional (or dummy) leader. If the resulting MLSLMF programming problem consist...
A Method for Solving Some Class of Multilevel Multi-leader Multi-follower Programming Problemsdoi:10.1007/978-3-030-21803-4_59Addis Belete ZewdeSemu Mitiku KassaSpringer, ChamWorld Congress on Global Optimization
A Receding-Horizon Leader-Follower Technique for Solving Formation Backwards Problems of Multiple Mobile RobotsChen, JianChen, HaoyaoSun, Dong
Zhu Y, Zheng Z, Zhang XY, Cai K (2014) Leader-follower hierachical decision model for critical infrastructure protection and its solving algorithm. Syst Eng-Theory Pract 34(6):1557- 1565 [In Chinese]Zhu Y, Zheng Z, Zhang XY, Cai K (2014) Leader-follower hierachical decision model for...
A leader鈥揻ollower facility problem is considered in this paper. The objective is to maximize the profit obtained by a chain (the leader) knowing that a competitor (the follower) will react by locating another single facility after the leader locates its own facility. A subpopulation-based ...
We derive Nash-s-stationary equilibria for a class of quadratic multi-leader-follower games using the nonsmooth best response function. To overcome the challenge of nonsmoothness, we pursue a smoothing approach resulting in a reformulation as smooth Nash equilbrium problem. We prove existence and ...
Accumulation points of Nash equilibria exist for a decreasing sequence of these smoothing parameters and we show that these candidates fulfil the conditions of S-stationarity and are Nash equilibria to the multi-leader-follower game. Finally, we propose an update on the leader variables for ...