The default seccomp profile in Docker may often be"good enough"and if you have no experience with it, then"improving"or otherwise customizing it might not be the best use of your time. There are however some reasons that might give you enough motivation to change the default ...
* Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order) * for each system call the task makes. * * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed. * * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure. */ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int...
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prctl (PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT); printf ("Step 2: entering the strict mode. Only read(), write(), exit() and sigreturn() syscalls are allowed\n"); pid = getpid (); printf ("!!YOU SHOULD NOT SEE THIS!! My PID = %d", pid); return 0; } We save the program as ...
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 #define BPF_CLASS(code) ((code) & 0x07) //首先指定操作的类别 #define BPF_LD 0x00 //将操作数装入A或者X #define BPF_LDX 0x01 ...
but seccomp will restrict the set of available syscalls to only those the browser needs. For instance, seccomp may allow only the syscalls required for rendering a website. The reduced attack surface can prevent the attacker from gaining control over the system. This makes seccomp a powerful sec...
To prevent this, one must either be ‘CAP_SYS_ADMIN‘ (read: root), either explicitly accept to never get any more privileges. For example the ‘setuid‘ bit of ‘sudo‘ would not be honored. This can easily be achieved by adding this snippetbeforeinstalling the filter: ...
but seccomp will restrict the set of available syscalls to only those the browser needs. For instance, seccomp may allow only the syscalls required for rendering a website. The reduced attack surface can prevent the attacker from gaining control over the system. This makes seccomp a powerful sec...
After a Seccomp policy is loaded to the kernel during process running, the policy exists in the memory as a singly linked list and cannot be modified. Seccomp policies can be set for a process for multiple times. When a process executes a system call, the kernel traverses the policies spec...
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 #define BPF_CLASS(code) ((code) & 0x07) //首先指定操作的类别 #define BPF_LD 0x00 //将操作数装入A或者X #define BPF_LDX 0x01 ...