O. 1960: Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Quine, W. V. O. 1966: “Mr Strawson on Logical Theory.” Repr. in Quine, W. V. O.: The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. New York: Random House. Quine, W. V. O. 1969: Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York:...
Other passages in Quine's work where pragmatism and the classical pragmatists are discussed in detail are few in number. Quine criticizes Peirce's theory of truth (the claim that to be true is to be believed at the limit of inquiry) in Chapter 1 of Word and Object (1960). Quine claims...
and the word ‘red’ or ‘red object’ is true of each of sundry individual entities which are red houses, red roses, red sunsets; but there is not, in addition, any entity whatever, individual or otherwise, which is named by the word ‘redness...
The words „houses‟, „roses‟, and „sunsets‟ are true of sundry individual entities which are houses and roses and sunsets, and the word „red‟ or „red object‟ is true of each of sundry individual entities which are red houses, red roses, red sunsets; but there ...
‘roses’, and ‘sunsets’ are true of sundry individual entities which are houses and roses and sunsets, and the word ‘red’ or ‘red object’ is true of each of sundry individual entities which are red houses, red roses, red sunsets; but there is not, in addition, any entity ...
‘roses’, and ‘sunsets’ are true of sundry individual entities which are houses and roses and sunsets, and the word ‘red’ or ‘red object’ is true of each of sundry individual entities which are red houses, red roses, red sunsets; but there is not, in addition, any entity ...