Preimage attack on step-reduced MD5 - Sasaki, Aoki - 2008 () Citation Context ...esented by De et al. in 2007. It attacked the first 26 steps with a SAT solver [4]. At ACISP 2008, Sasaki and Aoki presented a preimage attack with a complexity of 296 on intermediate 44 steps of ...
Key words: hash function; preimage attack; collision attack; meet-in-the-middle attack; SM3 [5] 的征集活动 ,并于2012 年 10 月公布了新一代杂 1 引言 凑函数标准——Keccak算法。 杂凑函数在密码学中具有重要的地位,安全的 随着SHA-3 征集活动的进行,各国都在制定自 杂凑函数能够抵抗碰撞攻击、原根...
This paper presents preimage attacks on the hash functions 3-pass HAVAL and step-reduced MD5. Introduced in 1992 and 1991 respectively, these functions underwent severe collision attacks, but no preimage attack. We describe two preimage attacks on the compression function of 3-pass HAVAL. The ...
preimage attackThe construction of the initial structure for preimage attack of MD5 is proposed in this paper. With the help of C;divide-and-ruleD; technique, the successful possibility of the construction is higher than 2-32 . Our construction is based on the MD5 structure, the message ...
For example, in the case of MD5 with the Kernen sequence, we reduce the memory complexity from about \\(2^{51}\\) blocks to about \\(2^{26.7}\\) blocks (about 545 MB). We also present an essentially memoryless variant of Andreeva et al. attack. In case of MD5-Kernen or SHA1...
The proposed attack is based on meet-in-the-middle attacks. It seems difficult to find "independent words" of Tiger at first glance, since its key schedule function is much more complicated than that of MD4 or MD5. However, we developed techniques to find independent words efficiently by ...
Automatic searchMILPThe Meet-in-the-Middle (MITM) preimage attack is highly effective in breaking the preimage resistance of many hash functions, including but not limited to the full MD5, HAVAL, and Tiger, and reduced SHA-0/1/2. It was also shown to be a threat to hash functions built...
For example, in the case of MD5 with the Keranen sequence, we reduce the memory complexity from about 2~(51) blocks to about 2~(26.7) blocks (about 545 MB). We also present an essentially memoryless variant of Andreeva et al. attack. In case of MD5-Keranen or SHA1-Keranen, the ...
We also present an essentially memoryless variant of Andreeva et al. attack. In case of MD5-Ker篓anen or SHA1-Ker篓anen, the offline and online memory complexity is 215.2 message blocks (about 188-235 KB), at the expense of increasing the offline time complexity....