outside directors and ceo turnover(外部董事和首席执行官营业额) Journal of Financial Economics20 (1988)431-460. North-Holland OUTSIDE DIRECTORS AND CEO TURNOVER Michael !I.WEISBACH* Univemivof Rochester,Rochester,NY I 462 7, USA ReceivedJanuary1987,finalversionreceivedJuly 1987 ‘this paper examin...
Outside directors and CEO turnover Journal of Financial Economics MS Weisbach 被引量: 5095发表: 1988年 Incentive Compensation for Outside Directors and CEO Turnover As monitors of management, independent outside directors play an important oversight and monitoring role in corporate governance. By ...
CEOoutside directorsagency conflictsThis paper shows outside directors have a substantially greater chance of obtaining new positions (CEO, COB, directorships) during a CEO turnover year in firms that hire a CEO externally. Over 70% of these external CEO hiring decisions result in new positions ...
Outside directors and CEO turnover Outside directors and CEO turnover Pattern Formation Outside of Equilibrium Pattern formation outside of equilibrium Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth ☆ Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods ...
Outside directors and CEO turnover Journal of Financial Economics (1988) American Law Institute Principles of corporate governance and structure: Restatement and recommendations Jeremy Bacon Corporate directorship practices: Membership and committees of the board (1973) Barry D. Baysinger et al. Corporate...
CEO turnover is higher when the investigation evidence is collected by outside advisors, specifically forensic accountants. Finally, the likelihood of an SEC sanction is (1) lower when evidence comes from AC-led investigations and (2) higher when evidence is collected by outside legal advisors. ...
Our study reveals how two separate dimensions of board composition—the proportion of independent directors and of non-independent directors—influence CEO compensation in Western European firms. Controlling for the simultaneous determination of CEO pay structure and board design, we find that firms with...
CEO directors are present. We find little evidence of improved or worse CEO turnover decisions. In another test, we investigate whether firms with CEO directors make better acquisitions, where the quality of an acquisition is measured by the firm’s abnormal return at the time of the acqui...
(SEC)actionsare limited.However,directorsexperiencesignificantlabormarketpenalties.In ∗ TheUniversityofChicago.Iwouldliketothankmydissertationcommittee:PaulHealy, KrishnaPalepu,andGregMillerfortheirinvaluableguidanceandsupport.Ihavegreatlyben- efitedbycommentsandsuggestionsfromKristenAndersen,GeorgeBaker,Ray...
Answer to: The [{Blank}] role emphasizes a manager's contacts with those outside the formal chain of command. A) liaison B) monitor C) disseminator...