本文属于博弈论领域,探究了policy gradient method 在多人非零和博弈中的收敛性,当然这样的工作不可能对所有的 general-sum game 有一个统一的回答,故本文主要选择了一种特殊的game来进行探索,即 Linear-quadratic game (LQG). 不同于较为简单的normal-form game 和相对复杂的 finite state Markov game, LQG的基...
We study the complexity of computing or approximating refinements of Nash equilibrium for a given finite n-player extensive form game of perfect recall (EFGPR), where n >= 3. Our results apply to a number of well-studied refinements, including sequential
Given an impartial combinatorial game G∈CG, we may use the Sprague Grundy Function to determine whether or not the first or second player has a winning strategy (hence permitting that player to win) under the “normal play” convention (whereby the first player who cannot make a legal move...
They, however, studied the problem of a monopolist, i.e., there is no Colonel Blotto game. Tang and Zhang [28] considered mixed extensions of normal-form games where mixed strategies correspond to points on a Euclidean sphere. Paarporn et al. [22] assumed one-sided incomplete information ...
17. Any situation can be considered a game if agents maximize their own gains by anticipating the actions of their opponents18,19. A game requires only a set of players, a set of strategies for each player, and corresponding pay-offs for each strategy in response to the strategies of ...
We study the problem of computing Nash equilibria in a two-player normal form (bimatrix) game from the perspective of parameterized complexity. Recent results proved hardness for a number of variants, when parameterized by the support size. We complement those results, by identifying three cases ...
two-stage extensive-form gamesequilibrium theory/ A0250 Probability theory, stochastic processes, and statistics B0240E Game theory C1140E Game theoryWe extend the Level- n theory of bounded rationality from the domain of symmetric normal-form games to the domain of simple two-player, two-stage...