They, however, studied the problem of a monopolist, i.e., there is no Colonel Blotto game. Tang and Zhang [28] considered mixed extensions of normal-form games where mixed strategies correspond to points on a Euclidean sphere. Paarporn et al. [22] assumed one-sided incomplete information ...
本文属于博弈论领域,探究了policy gradient method 在多人非零和博弈中的收敛性,当然这样的工作不可能对所有的 general-sum game 有一个统一的回答,故本文主要选择了一种特殊的game来进行探索,即 Linear-quadratic game (LQG). 不同于较为简单的normal-form game 和相对复杂的 finite state Markov game, LQG的基...
Thus, approximating one such (delta-almost)equilibrium for n-player EFGPRs, n >= 3, is P-time equivalent to approximatinga (delta-almost) NE for a normal form game (NFG) with 3 or more players. NFGsare trivially encodable as EFGPRs without blowup in size. Thus our resultsextend the...
For symmetric normal form games, all evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS's), whether pure or mixed, are limit asymptotically stable. Here, conditions are... G.,Müller,W.,... - 《Journal of Inherited Metabolic Disease》 被引量: 35发表: 1998年 Parental care as a game A new game model...
Given an impartial combinatorial game G∈CG, we may use the Sprague Grundy Function to determine whether or not the first or second player has a winning strategy (hence permitting that player to win) under the “normal play” convention (whereby the first player who cannot make a legal move...
The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an n-player extensive form game of perfect recall We study the complexity of computing or approximating refinements of Nashequilibrium for a given finite n-player extensive form game of perfect recall(EFGP... K Etessami - 《Eprint ...
We study the complexity of computing or approximating refinements of Nash equilibrium for a given finite n-player extensive form game of perfect recall (EFGPR), where n >= 3. Our results apply to a number of well-studied refinements, including sequential
We extend the Level- n theory of bounded rationality from the domain of symmetric normal-form games to the domain of simple two-player, two-stage extensive-form games. We designed and conducted experiments to test pertinent hypotheses. The extended Level- n model fits the data remarkably well ...
For symmetric normal form games, all evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS's), whether pure or mixed, are limit asymptotically stable. Here, conditions are... R Cressman,KH Schlag - 《Discussion Paper Serie B》 被引量: 8发表: 1995年 The cost of dishonesty A game theoretic model in the for...
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, contingent on the recipient playing the strategy indicated in the offer. Such ...