Nash equilibriumWe study the first price auction game with an arbitrary number of bidders when the bidders' valuations are independent from each other. In technical words, we work within the "independent private value model". We show that if the supports of the valuation probability distributions ...
We develop a Bayes–Nash analysis of the generalized second-price (GSP) auction, the multi-unit auction used by search engines to sell sponsored advertisin... R Gomes,K Sweeney - 《Games & Economic Behavior》 被引量: 66发表: 2014年 Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium corr...
This paper studies the evolutionary stability of the unique Nash equilibrium of a first price sealed bid auction. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium is not asymptotically stable under payoff monotonic dynamics for arbitrary initial populations. In contrast, for some classes of bid functions, when...
rst price auction with private values where the winning bid is observed. Let NE be the unique (symmetric) Nash equilibrium and let the function : [s; s] ! R+ be di¤ erentiable, nondecreasing, and satisfy (s) = 0 and (s) < s s. Then SCE = NE + is a symmetric SCE. NE(s)...
Bidding above the risk‐neutral Nash equilibrium in first price sealed bid auctions has traditionally been ascribed to risk aversion. Later studies, however, offer other explanations and even argue that risk aversion plays no or a minor role. In a novel experimental design, we directly test the ...
information to intrepret field data from auctions has become increasingly widespread. Several different estimation strategies now exist. In this paper, I compare the performance of these different estimators using a stylized empirical model of a procurement auction within the independent private values ...
We then study a first-price path auction in this model. We show that, in the special case of parallel-path graphs, there is always a pure-strategy 蓻-Nash equilibrium in bids. However, this result does not extend to general ... D Ye,R Sami,Y Shi 被引量: 0发表: 2008年 Path Auct...
Once a government has decided to award a concession by auction, it needs to decide what kind of auction to use鈥攚hether a first-price or second-price auct... M Klein - The World Bank 被引量: 15发表: 1998年 An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information...
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the first-price auction. Irrespective of type, player 2 rejects a bribe of zero and post-rejection bids as in the symmetric BNE of the auction. Player 2 accepts the bribe of b > 0 if and only if his valuation θ 2 ≤ b. If player 2 rejects the...
incommissionrateundertwotypesofauctions;(2)equilibriumbiddingstrategyisincreasinginreserve priceunderthefirst-priceauctionandindependentofreservepriceunderthesecond-priceauction; (3)theexpectedpayoffofeachbidderisindependentofcommissionrateanddecreasinginreserve priceunderthefirst-priceauction,anditisindependentof...