This paper investigates stability properties of evolutionary selection dynamics in normal-form games. The analysis is focused on deterministic dynamics in continuous time and on asymptotic stability of sets of population states, more precisely of faces of the mixed-strategy space. The main result is ...
Evolutionary game theory is a field that studies the evolution of a group over time and analyzes the coordination between technological progress45 and economic growth46. It applies the principles of biological fitness and natural selection to explain the equilibrium evolution of mutation mechanisms47,48...
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An abstraction of normal form games is proposed, called Feasibility/Desirability Games (or FD Games in short). FD Games can be seen from three points of view: as a new presentation of games in which Nash equilibria can be found, as choice models in microeconomics or as a model of evolutio...
In this section we consider an asymmetric evolutionary game as in (17). We wish to study the relation between a Nash equilibrium of a normal form game and the replicator equation (see Theorem 5.4 below). Also we introduce the concept of strongly uninvadable profile (Definition 5.5), and it...
While learning models can be used as a selection device, the IEL model has not yet been tested in the context of selecting between multiple Nash equilibria. Additionally, the different treatments exhibit different dynamical properties, e.g., regarding the speed and monotonicity of convergence to ...
Evolutionary stability and dynamic stability in a class of evolutionary normal form games A stochastic process of long-term evolution due to mutation and selection is defined over an asexually reproducing population, with selection according to ... F Weissing,R Selten 被引量: 120发表: 1991年 Eco...
A complete game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a dass of evolutionary normal form games which are called 'RSP—games' since they include the well—known 'Rock—ScissorsPaper' game. RSP—games induce a rich selection dynamics, but they are simple enough to allow a global ...
Normal form game : A normal form game is a strategic interaction in which each ofnplayers chooses a strategy and then receives a payoff that depends on all agents' choices choices of strategy. In asymmetric two‐player normal form game, the two players choose from the same set of strategies...