It is well known that Nash equilibria may not be Pareto-optimal; worse, a unique Nash equilibrium may be Pareto-dominated, as in Prisoners' Dilemma. By contrast, we prove a previously conjectured result: every finite normal-form game of complete information and common knowledge has at least ...
It is well known that Nash equilibria may not be Pareto-optimal; worse, a unique Nash equilibrium may be Pareto-dominated, as in Prisoners' Dilemma. By contrast, we prove a previously conjectured result: every finite normal-form game of com- plete information and common knowledge has at leas...
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It is well known that Nash equilibria may not be Pareto-optimal; worse, a unique Nash equilibrium may be Pareto-dominated, as in Prisoners' Dilemma. By contrast, we prove a previously conjectured result: every finite normal-form game of complete information and common knowledge has at least ...
It is well known that Nash equilibria may not be Pareto-optimal; worse, a unique Nash equilibrium may be Pareto-dominated, as in Prisoners' Dilemma. By contrast, we prove a previously conjectured result: every finite normal-form game of com- plete information and common knowledge has at ...