内容提示: International Public Goods and Agency Problemsin Treaty OrganizationsRoger D. CongletonReceived: 16 February 2006 /Revised: 28 August 2006 /Accepted: 1 September 2006# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006Abstract This paper analyzes the extent to which international public goods and...
1.Three forms of business organizations and their advantages and disadvantages.2.Three main questions that corporate finance aims to address.3.The goals of financial management.4.The formation and resolution of agency problems.本章重点与难点
International public goods and agency problems in treaty organizations - Congleton - 2006 () Citation Context ...onal organizations to exist mainly or even exclusively in the provision of public goods. The main problem is seen to be the incentive to free ride, such that an undersupply of ...
就是代理问题的意思。什么是代理问题呢？股东如果自己经营企业，就不存在这个问题。但如果是请别人来经营，那么他请的总经理就是代理人，是代理这个股东来经营企业的。由于企业不是该总经理的，因此他的利益与股东的利益不可能完全一致，甚至为了个人利益有可能使股东利益造成损失。这就是所谓的代理问题。...
A n audi t b y someon e independen t o f the manager reduces th e incentive problem s that arise when the firm manager does no t own al l th e residua l claim s on th e firm . If Jensen an d Meckling s hypothesis is correct, independent audits are expected in the earliest ...
Answer to: According to the agency problem, ___ represent the principals of a corporation. A. shareholders. B. managers. C. employees. D...
Leaders in organizations would be fool to think that these macro-political phenomena, ‘as seen on TV’, have little to say in the leading our cosy and manageable business organizations. Frankly, if you want to be serious about ‘employee engagement’ you’d better look at those social scienc...
Social capital also lessens the accretive effect of CEO power on CEO compensation. These findings indicate that social capital mitigates agency problems by restraining managerial rent extraction in CEO compensation. Introduction Individuals, and even organizations, are susceptible to social influences in ...
7“Agency Problems & the Theory of the Firm” Managerial Incentive Problem: More complicated models (equations 5-7): ( are general conditions for full ex post settling up ) Sum of weights = 1 if expected MP nonstationary and differences in MP stationary. If risk bearers are risk averse: ...
This paper tackles a key problem in path dependence research: how can locked-in organizations regain their scope for maneuver? Leveraging insights from two